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Shulman: Internet Copyright Infringement Liability

COMMENT

INTERNET COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
LIABILITY: IS AN ONLINE ACCESS
PROVIDER MORE LIKE A LANDLORD OR A
DANCE HALL OPERATOR?

I.

INTRODUCTION

From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in
response to technological change. 1 Digital technolou is the
1. "[T]he invention of the . . . printing press . . . gave rise to the original
need for copyright protection." Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417, 430 (1984). Congress first enacted copyright legislation in 1790, limiting protection to maps, charts, and books. Andrea Sloan Pink, Copyright Infringement Post Isoquantic Shift: Should Bulletin Board Services Be Liable?, 43 UCLA L:
REv. 587, 597 (1995) (referring to Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15 § 1, 1 Stat. 124,
124 (repealed 1831». Since that time, the inventions of radio, television, movies,
and videocassette recorders ("vCRs") have had a dramatic impact on intellectual
property rights. BRUCE A. LEHMAN, INFoRMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFoRMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE
REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 4 (1995)
(hereinafter "NIl White Paper"). Responding to significant technological changes,
Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1976, noting that "[d]uring the past half
century a wide range of new techniques for capturing and communicating printed
matter, visual images, and recorded sounds have come into use, and the increasing
use of information storage and retrieval devices, communications satellites, and laser technology promise even greater changes in the near future." Id. at 8 (quoting
H.R. REp. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1976».
2. Digital technology is a method that converts information into an electrical
impulse in the form of a binary number, represented by either a zero or one. Robert D. Sprague, Multimedia: The Convergence of New Technologies and Traditional
Copyright Issues, 71 DENY. U.L. REv. 635, 637 n.9 (1994). For example, music is
initially composed of analog sound waves which can be converted into digital code
by breaking the waves into small bits of information expressed as a zero or a one.
Id. Before information can be received, stored, and manipulated by a computer, it
must be converted into digital code. Adam P. Segal, Dissemination of Digitized
Music on the Internet: A Challenge to the Copyright Act, 12 SANTA CLARA COMPUT-
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most recent innovation affecting copyright law and intellectual
property.3 Current technology can convert most forms of intellectual property into digital form! Computer networks, such
as the Internet,5 electronically transfer digital information
around the world. 6 The growing use of the Internet, coupled
with the availability of intellectual property in digital form,
create a technological backdrop for massive copyright infringement.7
ER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 97, 103 (1996) (noting quality of music distributed online
identical to original due to digital technology). Digitization allows all infonnation,
whether text, images or sounds, to be recorded and transmitted in a universal
computer language. Marshall Leaffer, Protecting Authors' Rights In A Digital Age,
27 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 6 (1995) (discussing the digital revolution).
3. Pink, supra note 1, at 588.
4. Id. at 590. For example, digitized music is available on compact discs.
Computer programs, magazines, books, and video games can all be digitized. Photographs can be stored on computer disks. In addition, companies are developing
fllmless electronic cameras to record photographs on a video floppy disk. With the
advent of digital scanners, entire books and magazines can be converted into digital fonn with little effort. Id. at 590-96.
5. The Internet is a giant network which connects innumerable smaller
groups of linked computer networks worldwide. American Civil Liberties Union v.
Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830-32 (E.D. Pa. 1996). It is thus a network of networks.
An estimated 9,400,000 host computers are linked to the Internet, approximately
60 percent of which are located within the United States. This count does not include the personal computers that people use to access the Internet. Some of the
computer networks that make up the Internet are owned by governmental agencies and public institutions, some are owned by non-profit organizations, and some
are privately owned. No single entity administers the Internet. A common feature
among all Internet-linked computer networks is an agreement to use the same data transfer protocols to insure technical compatibility in the transmission of communications between computers. Communication over this redundant system of
computer links could travel over any number of routes to its destination. Thus, a
message sent from a computer in Washington, D.C. to a computer in Palo Alto,
California, might first be sent to a computer in Philadelphia. If one computer network malfunctioned or was otherwise unavailable, the message would automatically
be re-routed across a different computer network, without any human intervention.
The Internet has evolved into a public communications forum, allowing anyone
with access to the Internet to exchange infonnation. Id. at 830-32. Contrary to
myth, the Internet did not begin as a Cold War effort by the U.S. military to establish defense communications in case of nuclear attack. KATIE HAFNER & MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE 10 (1996). Although funded by the
Defense Department, the computer network project, called ARPANET, linked researchers to powerful supercomputers located at key universities. Id. Later, it became a network allowing universities, corporations and people around the world to
exchange infonnation. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 831-32. It is estimated that 40 million people around the world access the Internet. The number of users is expected
to grow to 200 million Internet users by 1999. Id.
6. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 4.
7. Pink, supra note 1, at 592. The NIl White Paper states "the establishment
of high-speed, high-capacity electronic infonnation systems [computer networks)
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. Advances in digital technology have a significant impact
on intellectual property rights. 8 Authors are increasingly able
to distribute their works directly to consumers, reducing the
time between creation and distribution. 9 The Internet also
opens additional markets for authors.lO Creators have access
to the entire world of online users.ll Theoretically, every computer user can become his or her own publisher, and every
computer terminal can become a library, bookstore, or audio
and video jukebox. 12
Distribution on the Internet, however, exposes authors to
a greater risk of uncontrolled copying, adaptation and piracy
than traditional media. 13 Once a work is digitized, it can be

makes it possible for one individual, with a few key strokes, to deliver perfect copies of digitized works to scores of other individuals." NIl White Paper, supra note
1, at 7.
8. Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the 'Information Superhighway'; Authors, E%ploiters, and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1466, 1466-67
(1995).
9. Nil White Paper, supra note 1, at 6.
10. Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1467-68. The Internet provides an eJlsy and inexpensive way for an author to reach a large audience. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at
843. Using the World Wide Web, a popular graphical platform linking key words
or concepts to additional sites for more information, an author can establish a site
or "home page" to advertise and distribute her work. Id. at 836-42. Thus, start-up
costs of production and advertising are significantly lower using the Internet than
traditional media, greatly reducing cost barriers to market entry. Id. at 843. All
that is required to publish on the Web is a personal computer, appropriate software, and a modem to connect over a telephone line directly to the Internet or indirectly by subscribing to an Internet access provider. Id. at 837. Besides cost savings for authors, the Internet establishes a new venue for distribution. Patrick M.
Reilly, N2K Hires Phil Ramone to Start Up a Music Label Linked to the Internet,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 1996, at B5. For example, the record label N2K recently released a single from David Bowie's new album only available via its Internet site,
hoping to attract a new market segment. Id. In addition, various newspapers and
magazines have introduced electronic editions on the Internet that supplement or
exclusively present material. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 105. David Scott
Lewis, publisher of E-Magazine, distributed via the Internet, commented that "I
haven't spent a nickel and I'm putting out an international magazine and rounding up tens of thousands of subscribers." Pink, supra note 1, at 593 n.30 (quoting
Dean Takahashi, Paper-Less Publisher, LA TIMES (Orange County Ed.), Mar. 2,
1994, at D1.)
11. Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1467. The nature of Internet technology blurs
geographic boundaries, creating a worldwide electronic marketplace for the creator
of an artistic work. Fred H. Cate, Law in Cyberspace, 39 How. L.J. 565, 567
(1996).
12. Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1467.
13. Nil White Paper, supra note 1, at 6.
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stored, modified, and reproduced easily and quickly, with virtually no loss of quality.14 A single unauthorized uploading15 of
a copyrighted work onto an electronic bulletin board 16 may diminish or destroy the market for an author's work. 17 Such
exposure may inhibit an author's incentive to create new
works. IS

14. Michael D. McCoy & Needham J. Boddie, Cybertheft: Will Copyright Law
Prevent Digital Tyranny on the Superhighway?, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 169, 174
(1995).
15. "Uploading/downloading" are terms in the Internet lexicon. Uploading refers
to the transfer of information from a user's personal computer to a computer network, usually via a bulletin board, while downloading refers to the transfer of information from a bulletin board or the Internet to one's personal computer. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1554 nn. 1, 3 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
16. An electronic bulletin board system ("BBS") is an online service that allows
subscribers (free or for a fee) to exchange electronic mail messages ("e-mail"), text,
computer programs, photographs, music and other forms of information. Niva
Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on the Information Superhighway:
The Case Against Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board Operators, 13 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 345, 347 n.5 (1995). A user simply uploads material from her
computer onto the bulletin board. All subscribers have access to all bulletin board
messages, and any subscriber may download the material to her own computer.
Bulletin boards may be subject specific. Id. The electronic bulletin board is one of
the most popular services available through the Internet and other computer networks. Kelly Tickle, The Vicarious Liability of Electronic Bulletin Board Operators
for the Copyright Infringement Occurring on their Bulletin Boards, 80 IOWA L.
REv. 391, 394 (1995). An estimated 50,000 bulletin board systems now operate in
the United States. Id. at 395. More than 70,000 bulletin board systems are estimated in operation worldwide. Telephone Interview with Stanton McCandlish, Program Director of the Electronic Frontier Foundation (March 12, 1997). The number
of subscribers to bulletin boards vary. Tickle, supra, at 395. The largest bulletin
board systems, operated by commercial online services such as America Online,
CompuServe, Microsoft Network, and Prodigy, together have over twelve million
subscribers. George Tibbits, Microsoft Offers a Snazzier Online Service, S.F.
CHRON., Oct. 11, 1996, at E3~ Small bulletin board systems, often operating out of
an organizer's home, may have 20 to 200 subscribers. Tickle, supra, at 395.
17. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 6. Since digital works may be instantaneously transmitted to hundreds of thousands of bulletin board subscribers, a user could download or print unlimited copies of a copyrighted work without paying
a royalty to the copyright owner. Id. In 1994, electronic piracy on the Internet and
other computer networks accounted for nearly one billion dollars. Adam S.
Bauman, The Pirates of the Internet, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1994, at A1. In addition,
digital works are easily modified and manipulated, raising concerns about derivative works. Pink, supra note 1, at 595. A derivative work is "based upon one or
more preexisting works . . . in which a work may be recast, transformed or
adapted." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1996). Besides economic damage, digitization implicates
an author's moral rights in the integrity of her work, raising concerns about alteration or mutilation of a work in digital form. See, THOMAS J. SMEDINGHOFF, SOFTWARE PuBLISHER'S AsSOCIATION, LEGAL GUIDE TO MULTIMEDIA 57-60 (1994).
18. Leaffer, supra no'te 2, at 5.
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In addition to technological advances, the culture of the
Internet adds to copyright protection concerns. 19 The prevailing attitude of Internet users is that anything available over
the Internet should be free. 20 Thus, a basic tension exists between the goal of a free flow of information on the Internet and
the protection of intellectual property rights. 21 Finding solutions to protect intellectual property rights while maintaining
the unrestricted flow of ideas via the Internet is essential to
realizing the full potential of the Internet.22
The digital environment of cyberspace23 poses serious
challenges to existing copyright law. 24 The development of
legal standards of liability for copyright infringement lags
behind advances in digital technology and growth of the
Internet.25 The liability of an Internet access provider (hereinafter "access provider',)26 for the infringing activities of one of
19. Segal, supra note 2, at 98-100 (discussing entitlement philosophy of
Internet users).
20.Id.
21. See NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 6; McCoy & Boddie, supra note 14,
at 169-72 (discussing author's fear of electronic theft and potential chilling effect
on development of Internet); Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1467 (discussing whether
author will be in driver's seat on information highway or "deer in the headlights"
of vast traffic author cannot control).
22. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 6.
23. The term "cyberspace" was coined by science fiction novelist William Gibson to describe the fantasy electronic world in which his characters interacted.
Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to
the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1639 n.3 (1995). The
term has been adopted by users of computer networks as a metaphor to represent
an electronic representation of the real world, broadly encompassing the entire
experience of communicating through computer networks. Id.
24. Tickle, supra note 16, at 392.
25. Id. at 392 n.5.
26. An access provider is distinguished from a commercial online service in
this Comment. An access provider is a company that leases the use of its computer facilities to connect Ii. subscriber to a regional network linked to the Internet.
Karen S. Frank, Potential Liability on the Internet, 437 PLIIPat 417, 422 (1996).
Netcom On-line Communication Services is the country's largest access provider.
David Einstein, AT & T Move Hurts Internet Providers, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 28,
1996, at B3. Others are PANIX, and Infinet. Frank, supra, at 422. In contrast, a
commercial online service not only provides access to the Internet, but also offers
proprietary content-based services through its own private computer network. Id.
The largest commercial online services are America On-line, CompuServe, Microsoft
Network, and Prodigy. Tibbits, supra note 16, at E3. These commercial online services create content-based services specifically for their subscribers. Alex Alben,
What is an On-line Service? (In the Eyes of the Law), 13 No. 6 COMPUTER LAw 1,
3 (1996). Content services may include news stories, original articles, shopping in-
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its subscribers is far from clear. 27 The few cases involving the
Internet have been decided with inconsistent results. 28 Thus,
case law has left online access providers uncertain about when
and under what circumstances they would be liable for the
infringing activities of their users.29
Although the case did not involve the Internet, the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction30 may have a
significant impact on an access provider's liability.31 In this
case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded
that the operator of a swap meet may be held contributorily
and vicariously liable for copyright infringement, based on a
finding that it had rented booths to vendors who sold counterfeit tape recordings. 32 Considering the Ninth Circuit holding
in Fonovisa, online access providers may face greater scrutiny
for a subscriber's infringing activities. 33
This Comment examines the issue of whether an access
provider may be found liable for copyright infringement by a
bulletin board subscriber. 34 It provides a background of copyright law and policy,35 discusses traditional legal theories of

formation, or sports scores and weather information automatically updated from a
wire service. Id. Other services may include operating bulletin boards, hosting chat
groups, or setting up interactive discussion forums. Giorgio Bovenzi, Liabilities of
System Operators on the Internet, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93, 99 (1996).
27. Tickle, supra note 16, at 398.
28. Kevin M. Cox, Online Service Providers and Copyright Law: The Need for
Change, 1 SYRACUSE J. LEGIS.&POL'y. 197, 199 (1995). See Cubby v. CompuServe,
776 F. Supp. 135, 140-41 (S.D. N.Y. 1991) (holding online service provider not liable for defamatory statement of subscriber without actual or constructive knowledge); Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1559 (holding bulletin board system operator liable
for direct infringement regardless of lack of knowledge of infringing activities of
subscriber); Sega Enters., Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679, 687 (N.D. Cal. 1994)
(granting copyright owner's motion for preliminary injunction based on strong likelihood of success in showing contributory infringement by bulletin board system
operator); ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 883 (holding provisions in Communications Decency Act of 1996 which impose liability on Internet access providers for transmission of obscene and indecent communications unconstitutional).
29. Cox, supra note 28, at 202.
30. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
31. David Goldberg & Robert J. Bernstein, Contributory Liability for Swap
Meets, Internet Providers, 215 N.Y.L.J., May 17, 1996, at 3, 3.
32. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 261-64.
33. Goldberg, supra note 31, at 33.
34. See infra part III.
35. See infra notes 46-85 and accompanying text.
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copyright infringement liability,36 and analyzes a recent case
that, for the first time, directly addressed the issue of an
Internet access provider's liability, Religious Technology Center
v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services. 37 This Comment
discusses the application of the legal principles in Fonovisa v.
Cherry Auction to the potential liability of an online access
provider. 3s This Comment concludes with a critique proposing
that revision of the copyright law is necessary to preserve
intellectual property rights without chilling the growth of the
Internet. 39

II. BACKGROUND
To understand the complexity of liability issues in the
online environment, a familiarity with the statutory rights
granted to authors, limitations such as the "fair use" doctrine,
rules regarding infringement and the explication of those rules
through case law is important. 40 This section summarizes
copyright law and its underlying purpose to promote the progress of science and the useful arts, motivating the first Copyright Act signed into law in 1790 by George Washington41 to
the current revisions. 42 Next, this section analyzes traditional
theories of infringement liability and traces the applicable case
law. 43 Finally, this section analyzes the first case to directly
address the liability of an Internet access provider, Religious
Technology Center v. Netcom. 44 Although the case settled before reaching judicial determination, a pre-trial ruling on a
motion for summary judgment raises the possibility that an
access provider may be held contributorily liable for copyright

36. See infra notes 86-170 and accompanying text.
37. Religious Technology Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc.,
907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). See infra notes 171-234 and accompanying
text.
38. This will be done by applying the Fonovisa analysis to the facts presented
in Netcom.
39. See infra notes 354-64 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 54-170 and accompanying text.
41. NIl White Paper, supra note I, at 11 n.31.
42. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1996).
43. See infra notes 86-170 and accompanying text.
44. Religious Technology Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Communication Servs., Inc.,
907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
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infringement by computer users.45
A.

COPYRIGHT LAw AND POLICY

Intellectual property protection in the United States has
both a constitutional and statutory basis. 46 Under the Constitution, Congress has the power to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors
and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings
and discoveries. 47 The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to provide authors an economic incentive to create
and make their works available to the public. 48 Thus, the primary purpose of copyright law is to motivate the creation of
works of literature, music, art and entertainment for the benefit of society.49 As the text of the Constitution makes clear, it
is Congress that has the task of defining the scope of copyright
protection to balance the competing interests of authors and
society. 50 Congress enacted the first copyright law on May 31,
1790. 51 Repeatedly, as innovations in technology altered the
balance, Congress fashioned new rules. 52 Digital communica45. [d. at 1383.
46. Ariel B. Taitz, Removing Road Blocks Along the Information Superhighway:

Facilitating the Dissemination of New Technology by Changing the Law of Contributory Copyright Infringement, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 133, 137 (1995).
47. u. S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
48. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558
(1985).
49. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 11-13. The Supreme Court has often articulated the purpose of copyright, stating that the primary objective of copyright
is not to reward the labor of authors. Feist Publication, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Servo
Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991). Rather, it is to "promote the progress of science
and useful arts." Id. By granting a marketable right to the author, copyright supplies the economic incentive to produce and distribute creative works. Harper &
Row, 471 U.S. at 546. The monopoly created by copyright thus rewards the individual author so that the public will benefit. Sony Corp. of Am. V. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 477 (1984). In Mazer V. Stein, the Supreme Court stated that the "economic philosophy behind the [constitutional] clause . . . is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to
advance public welfare ...." Mazer V. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
50. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
51. NIl White Paper, supra note 1 at 11 n.31.
52. Sony, 464 U.S. at 430-31. For example, development of the copy machine
prompted a statutory exemption for library copying in the Copyright Act of 1976;
development of computer software prompted expansion of copyright protection; development of cable and microwave technologies prompted enactment of re-transmission of television program provisions; development of the audio tape recorder
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tions and the Internet now present new challenges to preserve
the balance. 53
1. Exclusive rights
To accomplish the goal of stimulating creativity, the 1976
Copyright ActM grants the owner of a copyright certain exclusive rights for a limited time,55 often referred to as a "bundle
of rights."56'Under the terms of the Act, a copyright owner has
exclusive rights to reproduce the copyrighted work,57 prepare
derivative works,58 distribute copies,59 and in certain instancprompted the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971. [d. at 430 n.ll.
53. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 8.
54. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1996). For more than two centuries, U.S. copyright
law has been periodically amended to adapt to technology changes; the 1976 Copyright Act is the most recent major revision. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 8.
55. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1996). Generally, a copyrighted work is protected
for the length of the author's life plus another 50 years. [d. The terms of protection for works created before January 1, 1978, the effective date of the 1976 revisions to the Copyright Act, are set forth in sections 303 and 304 of the Act. See
17 U.S.C. §§ 303-04 (1996). When the term of protection for a copyrighted work
expires, the work falls into the "public domain," the legal status for a work that
does not require permission to use. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 38.
56. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 220 (1990).
57. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1996). This right is defined as the right to reproduce
the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords. [d. Because of the nature of computer technology, this right is implicated in most Internet transmissions. NIl
White Paper, supra note 1, at 41. For example, when a computer user downloads
a file from a bulletin board, a copy is reproduced in the user's computer memory.
Under U.S. copyright law, a copy is made and subject to infringement liability
whenever a work is placed into a computer, irrespective of whether the work is
stored on a disk, hard drive or in the random access memory (RAM) of the user's
computer; when a photograph is scanned into a digital file; when a sound recording is digitized; or when a digitized file is transferred from one computer to another via a computer network. [d. at 41-42.
58. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1996). A "derivative work is a work based upon one or
more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization,
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, . . . or
any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted." 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1996). This right is also implicated in the transmission of messages
on the Internet. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 43. A computer user who edits,
translates, or otherwise modifies a downloaded file creates a derivative work. [d.
59. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1996). The copyright owner has the exclusive right to
sell, give away, rent or lend copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public. [d.. According to a Florida district court, the unauthorized downloading of
copyrighted photographs by bulletin board subscribers implicated the copyright
owner's right to distribute copies. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp.
1552, 1556 (M.D. Fla. 1993). Notwithstanding such right, the owner of a legal copy
or phonorecord has the right to sell or otherwise dispose of her copy. 17 U.S.C.
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es, publicly perform60 or display61 the work. 62 Each of these
§109(a) (1996). Such right is referred to as the "first sale" doctrine. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 43. This means that the copyright owner generally has only
the right to authorize or prohibit the initial distribution of a copy of a copyrighted
work. [d. It is unclear, however, if the legal owner of a copyrighted work, such as
a CD, may upload it onto a bulletin board for others to download. Segal, supra
note 2, at 115-16. Part of the confusion arises from the nature of a digital transaction. Unlike a conventional transaction in which the original owner no longer
possesses her copy, in a digital transaction, the original owner retains her copy.
This aspect of dispossession is extremely important. [d. Under the "first-sale doctrine," the original owner may "dispose of the possession of that copy" without infringing the author's right of distribution. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1996). Therefore, if
one characterizes the uploading of a lawful copy of a work onto a bulletin board
for others to download as a distribution rather than a reproduction, the computer
user may be entitled under the first-sale doctrine to re-distribute the work without
infringing the copyright owner's right of distribution. Segal, supra, at 116. President Clinton's task force on the National Information Infrastructure takes the position that no loophole exists because a digital transmission does not fit the terms
of the first-sale limitation. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 61. The first sale
doctrine limits only the copyright owner's distribution right; it in no way affects
the reproduction right. ld. at 59. Under current technology, a computer user who
transmits a copy of a copyrighted work via the Internet is actually reproducing
the work because she retains her original copy. Thus, the transmission would
constitute infringement of the copyright owner's reproduction right, unless exempt
under another provision of the Copyright Act. ld.
60. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1996). The public performance right is limited to literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, motion pictures and
other audiovisual works. ld. Only "public" performances are covered by copyright
law. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1996). The Copyright Act defines a "public" place as one
that is open to the public or any place where a substantial number of persons
outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered. ld.
Most commentators believe that the defmition of "public" is sufficiently broad to
apply to the Internet where multiple individual viewers may watch a performance
in a variety of locations at different times. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 46.
61. 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (1996). The right to display is available to copyright
owners of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, with the exception of sound recordings. ld. In
the context of the Internet, when a computer user posts a copyrighted work in
any medium and another user visually browses through it, the work has been displayed. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 46.
62. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1)-(5) (1996). It is important to note that the rights of
copyright owners of sound recordings, typically record companies, are listed separately in section 114(a). ld. § 114. Unlike copyright owners of the underlying musical composition, typically songwriters and music publishers, record companies do
not have the right to perform nor display the work publicly. ld. Thus, how a work
is categorized affects the bundle of rights accorded to it, raising issues of classification for "multimedia" works transmitted on the Internet. NIl White paper, supra
note 1, at 26-28. "Multimedia" works combine elements of text, sound, and images
in a single medium of expression. ld. The recent passage of the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act in November, 1996, however, creates an exclusive performance right in sound recordings that are digitally transmitted and
may otTer new protection in the online environment. Richard Raysman & Peter

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol27/iss3/12

10

Shulman: Internet Copyright Infringement Liability

1997] INTERNET COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT LIABILITY

565

exclusive rights is implicated by communication on the
Internet. 63
2. Infringement
Under the Copyright Act, any invasion of these exclusive
rights constitutes infringement. 54 Since scienter is not required, even innocent or accidental infringement is actionable. 65 The Copyright Act further prescribes an array of remedies to compensate owners for such copyright infringement. 66
To prevail on a claim of direct copyright infringement, a
plaintiff must prove 1) ownership of the copyrighted work and
2) "copying" by the defendant. 67 Implicit in the first requirement is eligibility for copyright protection. 6s Copyright protection extends only to works of authorship satisfying three crite-

Brown, Intellectual Copyright Developments, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 9, 1996, at 3, 3.
63. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 40-47.
64. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-05 (1996). Section 501(a) provides that anyone who
engages in or authorizes violation of any of the exclusive rights of the copyright
owner is an infringer of the copyright. Id. at §501(a). Of course, penIDssion of the
copyright owner exempts one from liability. NIl White Paper, supra note 1 at 65.
In addition, sections 107 through 118 of Title 17 describe a variety of uses of
copyrighted material that are not infringements. Sony, 464 U.S. at 447. Statutory
limitations on a copyright owner's exclusive rights include "fair use" enumerated in
section 107, certain library exemptions enumerated in section 108, the "first sale
doctrine" enumerated in section 109, performance or display of copyrighted works
in teaching activities by a nonprofit institution as enumerated in section 110, and
compulsory licensing provisions that allow cable systems and satellite operators to
retransmit copyrighted programming without infringement liability by paying a
statutory licensing fee. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-118 (1996).
65. Segal, supra note 2, at 125.
66. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 502-05 (1996). Remedies for infringement include an injunction to prevent further violation of the copyright holder's rights, impoundment
and destruction of all infringing works, the option of electing statutory damages or
actual damages and profits, and costs and attorneys' fees. Id.; Sony, 464 U.S. at
433-34. Criminal sanctions may also be levied if the infringement was willful and
for purposes of commercial advantage or private fmancial gain. See 17 U.S.C. §
506(a) (1996).
67. Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1556.
68. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 14. The Copyright Act enumerates eight
broad categories of protectible subject matter: 1) literary works (encompassing
computer programs); 2) musical works, including any accompanying words; 3)
dramatic works, including any accompanying music; 4) pantomimes and choreographic works; 5) pictorial, graphic and sculptural works; 6) motion pictures and
other audiovisual works; 7) sound recordings; and 8) architectural works. 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(a) (1996).
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ria: originality, creativity, and fIxation in a tangible medium of
expression. 69 Even if they meet these criteria, certain works
and subject matter are expressly excluded from protection
under the Copyright Act. 70 Ideas and facts are not copyrightable; this protection extends only to the expression of ideas and
facts. 71 In addition, titles, names, short phrases and slogans,72 as well as works of the U.S. Government, are generally not copyrightable. 73
With regard to the second requirement in an infringement
action, courts generally use the term "copying" as shorthand
for a violation of any of the exclusive rights of the copyright
owner, not merely the reproduction right.74 In the context of
the Internet, recent cases have held that the process of uploading or downloading digital messages constitutes copying. 75
Thus, individuals who post or receive unauthorized copies of
copyrighted work on the Internet may be liable for copyright
infringement. 76

69. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 14. To be original, a work must be independently created and not copied. In contrast to patent law, there is no requirement that a work be novel, unique or ingenious. As to creativity, the threshold is
very low. [d. "The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they
possess some creative spark . . . ." Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. Congress left room for
technological advances in the area of fIxation by noting that the method of fIxation
may be "now known or later developed." See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1996). A work is
fIxed "when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated
for a period of more than transitory duration." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1996). As an example, the telecast of a live baseball game that is videotaped at the same time it
is broadcast is fIxed in a tangible form, thus copyrightable. Baltimore Orioles, Inc.
v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 480 U.S. 941 (1987).
70. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 20.
71. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 547; 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1996).
72. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 20.
73. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (1996).
74. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 66.
75. Advanced Computer Servs. of Michigan, Inc. v. MAl Systems Corp., 845 F.
Supp. 356, 363 (E.D. Va. 1994) (holding that "copying" for the purposes of copyright law occurs when a computer program is placed into a computer's random access memory); Triad Systems Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330,
1335 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied , 116 S. Ct. 1015 (1996); see 2 MELVILLE B.
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §8.08(A)(1) at 8-112 (1994).
76. Taitz, supra note 46, at 152.
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Fair Use Defense

One of the statutory limitations on a copyright owner's
exclusive rights is the doctrine of fair use. 77 Fair use is an
affirmative defense to an action for copyright infringement. 78
The judicially-created doctrine, now codified in the Copyright
Act, excuses otherwise infringing conduct if the social benefit
outweighs the loss to the copyright owner. 79 This defense reflects the basic goal of copyright law .in balancing an author's
claim to her work against the public's interest in access to the
work.80
Statutory language suggests the type of activities which
might be considered fair use: criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching or research. 81 A common example of fair use is
the incorporation of a quotation from a book or play by a reviewer. 82 In applying the doctrine of fair use, the courts consider four factors enumerated in the Act. 83 These factors include the purpose of the use, the nature of the material, the
amount used, and, perhaps most importantly, the effect of the
use upon the market for or value of the copyrighted work. 84
The determination of fair use requires a case-by-case analysis
and is difficult to predict.85

77. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1996).
78. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1177 (1994). As an affirmative defense, the defendant carries both the burden of coming forward with
evidence and persuasion to avoid liability. [d.
79. Elkin-Koren, supra note 16, at 365-66.
80. [d. at 365.
81. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1996).
82. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 47.
83. Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1557.
84. Eric J. Schwartz, Address at the American Bar Association Summer Conference (June 28, 1996) (transcript available in office of Proskauer Rose Goetz &
Mendelsohn LLP); see 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1996).
85. Schwartz, supra note 84. In the notable decision involving the manufacturer of VCRs, the Supreme Court held videotaping at home to make time-shifting
tapes of copyrighted television programs was fair use. Sony, 464 U.S. at 456. In
contrast, a New York district court held a school system's taping of educational
television broadcasts to create an educational film library for later use in classrooms was not fair use. Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 558 F.
Supp. 1247, 1252 ·(W.D.N.Y. 1983). Despite its commercial purpose, the Supreme
Court held a parody of lyrics of the popular song "Oh, Pretty Woman" was not per
se unfair use, giving the parody leeway because of its "transformative" use. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1177. Courts have repeatedly identified the economic effect on
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B. TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF INFRINGEMENT LIABILITY

The Copyright Act expressly provides only for liability
based on direct copyright infringement. 86 The statute contains
no provision for liability based on acts committed by another.87 Rather, the courts have developed standards of third party . liability through case law, drawing from patent law and
traditional tort theories of contributory and vicarious liability.88 Copyright law imposes different standards of liability for
direct, contributory, and vicarious forms of copyright infringement. 89 For example, direct infringers are held to a standard
of strict liability, assuring a high probability of successful prosecution. 90 Unlike direct infringement, however, contributory
infringement requires proof of knowledge, which increases the
difficulty of successful legal action. 91 Thus, the controlling legal theory affects the likelihood of success in a claim for copyright infringement. 92 Because of the small number of cases
involving the Internet, and their inconsistent results, the legal
theory of liability for an online access provider is not clear.93
The lack of clarity in characterizing the role of an access

the market a8 the most significant of the four factors. Stewart, 495 U.S. at 238.
The Supreme Court held that Nation magazine's scoop of Time magazine's right to
publish the first serial of President Ford's memoirs was not fair use, notwithstanding the newsworthiness of its account of the Nixon pardon. Harper & Row,
471 U.S. at 569. In its analysis, the court found that the magazine caused economic harm by causing cancellation of Time's contract with Harper & Row. [d. at
567.
86. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04
(1996).
87. [d.

88. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 71.
89. [d. at 74.
90. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1996). In contrast to copyright law, other bodies of

law do not adopt strict liability. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 74. Defamation, for example, requires knowledge for liability. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc.,
776 F. Supp. 135, 140-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). In that case, the court likened
CompuServe, an online content-provider, to an electronic library, without any practical ability to monitor all users. [d. at 137. Consequently, the court held that
CompuServe could not be found liable unless it knew or had reason to know of
the defamatory statements. [d. at 140-41.
91. Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
92. Taitz, supra note 46, at 153-56.
93. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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provider in infringing activities by computer users has serious
implications for both the copyright owner and access provider.94 For the copyright owner, legal action against an access
provider may be one of the few avenues for economic relief. 95
Although copyright owners may have a strong legal case
against individual users making unauthorized copies on the
Internet, locating them may be almost impossible, and the cost
of litigation against these individuals would likely dwarf the
amount of any recovery.96 Consequently, if the copyright owner is to enjoy any practical relief, she will proceed against a defendant with "deep pockets. n97 In the context of the Internet,
the only practical "deep pocket" defendants are the access
provider and bulletin board system operator. 98 If legal action
is not effective, the incentive to create may be jeopardized.99
In addition, the fear of lost sales may motivate copyright owners to oppose and obstruct advancement of the Internet. 100
For the access provider, the threat of suit without knowing

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

PAUL GoLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT LAw AND PRACTICE 713 (1989)

Taitz, supra note 46, at 152-59.
[d. at 152.
See GoLDSTEIN, supra note 94, at 713.
Taitz, supra note 46, at 153-58. In Taitz's opinion, however, the viability of
legal action against access providers is short-term because technology advances will
circumvent the need for bulletin board systems and online service companies. [d.
at 158. She argues that the most effective remedy to deter infringement would be
a contributory copyright infringement suit against manufacturers of digital transmission equipment. [d. at 156-58. Until the courts modify the "substantial non-infringing uses" doctrine, however, Taitz believes legal action against equipment
manufacturers will almost certainly fail. [d. at 157.
99. [d. at 143.
100. [d. at 146. The record industry's opposition to the introduction of the DAT
player, a digital recording device capable of duplicating CDs on digital cassettes,
illustrates such opposition to technological development by copyright owners. [d. at
143-46. In 1985, Sony announced its intent to market consumer DAT recorders.
Gary S. Lutzker, DATs All Folks: Cahn v. Sony and the Audio Home Recording
Act of 1991 - Merrie Melodies or Looney Tunes?, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. J. 145,
172 (1992). Record companies, one of the most powerful groups of copyright owners, fearing that the DAT would displace sales of CDs, opposed its introduction.
Taitz, supra, at 146. Besides lobbying for royalty schemes and threatening to sue
manufacturers for contributory copyright infringement, almost all record companies
refused to produce prerecorded DATs, severely limiting the attractiveness of the
DAT player. [d. at 147. It was not until enactment of the Audio Home Recording
Act of 1992 ("AHRA"), seven years later, that the recorders reached the market.
The AHRA required manufacturers to pay a royalty fee to record companies, music
publishers and artists for every recorder and medium sold, as well as requiring
copy prevention technology in the machines that prevented copying of anything but
an original DAT. [d.
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which legal precedents apply may chlIl its investment in the
Internet. 101
1.

Direct infringement

A direct infringer is defined in the Copyright Act as anyone who violates one of the exclusive rights enumerated in
Section 106. 102 To establish direct copyright infringement, a
plaintiff must prove ownership of a valid copyright and "copying" by the defendant.103 Since direct evidence of copying is
rarely available, a plaintiff may prove copying by inference, by
showing that the defendant had access to the copyrighted work
and that the allegedly infringing work is substantially similar
to the copyrighted work. 1M
The standard for direct copyright infringement is strict
liability, regardless of intent or knowledge. 105 According to a
Florida federal district court, even an innocent infringer may
be liable. 1OO In Playboy Enterprises v. Frena, the publisher of
Playboy magazine alleged that Frena, a bulletin board operator, infringed its exclusive right to distribute when subscribers
uploaded the magazine's copyrighted photographs onto the
bulletin board for others to download. 107 The district court
agreed, applying the direct copyright infringement test. 108
Even though Frena contended that subscribers, not he, uploaded the photographs without his knowledge, the district
court held the bulletin board operator liable for direct infringement. 109 The court held that the plaintiff proved the requisite
elements of copyright ownership and violation of an exclusive

101. See Tickle, supra note 16, at 417-18 (noting the chilling effect on bulletin
board operators if held to a strict standard. of liability); Pink, supra note I, at
611-12 (noting online industry arguments against liability for copyright infringement by subscribers to prevent chilling effect on industry); Elkin-Koren, supra note
16, at 406 (noting risk of liability may discourage incentive to provide online services).
102. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1996).
103. Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1556.
lO4. [d.
105. Pink, supra note I, at 618.
106. Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1559.
107. [d. at 1554.
108. [d. at 1554-59.
109. [d.
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right,110 noting that knowledge or intent to infringe is not an
element of direct copyright infringement. 111 Although direct
copyright infringement is a strict liability tort, a fair use privilege and several other defenses are available. 112
2.

Contributory infringement

To be liable for contributory copyright infringement, the
plaintiff must prove that the alleged contributory infringer 1)
knew or should have known1l3 of the infringing activity1l4
and 2) "induced, caused or materially contributed to the infringing conduct of another. n115 Thus, the touchstones of contributory infringement are knowledge and participation. 116
Participation may take the form of personal conduct or the
contribution of materials or equipment that provide the means
of infringing.l17
The theory of contributory infringement, derived from the
common law doctrine that one who knowingly participates in
or furthers a tortious act is jointly and severally liable with the
prime tortfeasor,118 is a relatively recent development of copyright law. 119 Few precedents exist in the context of copyright. 120 Of those cases, several key decisions have helped

110. 1d. The Playboy court held that defendant infringed plaintiffs exclusive
rights of distribution and display; the court made no rmding concerning the right
of reproduction. 1d.
111. Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1559.
112. See supra notes 64, 77-80 and accompanying text.
113. Confusion persists regarding the level of knowledge required for contributory infringement in copyright law. Pink, supra note 1, at 623. Such confusion may
exist because copyright law was created by analogy to patent law. 1d. at 623-24.
The Patent Act requires that contributory infringers have actual knowledge. 35
U.S.C. § 271(c) (1996). In contrast, the Supreme Court in Sony required only constructive knowledge in the copyright context, a far broader basis of liability. Sony,
464 U.S. at 437-38 n.18 (1984).
114. To be liable as a contributory infringer, the plaintiff must first establish
direct copyright infringement by the primary infringer. Elkin-Koren, supra note 16,
at 365.
115. Sega Enters., Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679, 686 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
116. Pink, supra note 1, at 621.
117. Elkin-Koren, supra note 16, at 372.
118. Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp.
399, 402-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
119. Tickle, supra note 16, at 405.
120. 1d.
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shape the doctrine of contributory copyright infringement. 121
In Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 122 the Supreme Court held a
movie producer liable as a contributory infringer for the unauthorized film dramatization of the copyrighted book, Ben
Hur. 123 The movie producer hired a writer to create a screenplay based on the book.l24 In addition, the movie producer
designed advertisements that depicted the film as a dramatization of the book. 125 The movie producer then sold the film to
distributors who placed the film in theaters, giving rise to the
producer's argument that the distributors, not he, infringed the
copyrighted book. 126 The Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating that if the defendant was not liable unless he
were the direct infringer, it would be impossible to hold a third
party accountable. 127 This decision established the legal foundation that a defendant who knowingly and actively participates in the acts preceding infringement, but who falls just
short of committing the infringing act is liable as a contributory infringer. 128
Another important decision, Screen Gems-Columbia Music
v. Mark-Fi Records, highlighted the importance of knowledge
in establishing contributory infringement. l29 In that case,
music publishers sued a record company for reproducing its
songs in an unauthorized album.130 More importantly, the
music publishers also sued the particular radio stations that
sold advertising spots for the albums, the advertising agency
that purchased media time, and the service agency that handled mail order distribution of the albums. 131 The copyright
owners asserted that anyone involved in furthering sales of the
infringing records, with or without knowledge of the infringement, should be liable as contributory infringers. 132 Rejecting

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911).
Id. at 63
Id. at 60.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 62.
Kalem, 222 U.S. at 62-63.
Tickle, supra note 16, at 405.
Screen Gems-Columbia Music, 256 F. Supp. at 404.
Id. at 401.
Id. at 401-02.
Id. at 403.
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the assertion, the New York district court refused to impose
contributory infringement liability unless defendants knew or
had reason to know the album violated copyrighted works. 133
In Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, the Second Circuit articulated the modem test for contributory infringement. l34 The court defined a contributory
infringer as one who knowingly "induces, causes or materially
contributes to the infringing conduct of another . . . ."135 In
that case, a copyright owner sued a concert promoter for contributorily causing the infringing performance of its songs by
artists at local community concerts. l36 The defendant performed a dual role: it managed the artists and also functioned
as a concert promoter by organizing local nonprofit organizations around the country to sponsor a series of local community
concerts. 137 In holding the concert promoter liable, the circuit
court emphasized that the promoter knew that artists would
perform copyrighted songs at the concerts, and also created the
venue for the artists. 138
In the most recent development of the doctrine, Sony Corp.
of America v. Universal City Studios, the Supreme Court limited the scope of third party liability based on the contribution of
materials or equipment. 139 In its landmark decision, the Sony
court held that the sale of copying equipment alone does not
constitute contributory infringement if the product is capable
of "substantial noninfringing uses. "140 In that case, plaintiffs
brought a contributory copyright infringement action against
Sony Corporation, the manufacturer of video cassette record-

133. Id. at 403-05. In denying defendants' motion for summary judgment, the
district court held that defendants could be held l,iable if plaintiff proved at trial
that they had actual or constructive knowledge. Id.
134. Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1160.
137. Id. at 1160-6l.
138. Id. at 1162-63. The circuit court also held the concert promoter liable as a
vicarious infringer. Id.
139. Tickle, supra note 16, at 409.
140. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
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ers.141 Plaintiffs alleged that Sony supplied the means to accomplish the infringing activity of consumers who made illegal
copies of protected works. 142 In finding the manufacturer not
liable, the court applied a patent law principle which provides
that the sale of staple articles of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing uses does not constitute contributory
infringement.143 The court reasoned that holding manufacturers of such articles of commerce liable as contributory infringers would ''block the wheels of commerce. "144 Courts have not
yet decided whether the Sony limitation applies in an online
context. 145
Thus far, only one contributory copyright infringement
action involving the Internet has reached judicial decision. 146
In Sega Enterprises v. MAPHIA, a California district court imposed a preliminary injUnction against a bulletin board operator, concluding that Sega had shown a strong likelihood of
success in establishing a prima facie case of contributory infringement against the operator for unauthorized uploading
and downloading of Sega video games by subscribers. 147 The
court found that the bulletin board operator advertised the
video games on the bulletin board, actively solicited subscribers to download the games for a fee, and sold descrambling
141. Id. at 422. Plaintiffs in that case were Universal City Studios and Walt
Disney Productions. Id. at 421. Plaintiffs did not pursue any action against individual consumers. Id.
142. Id. at 420.
143. Id. at 440; 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1996). The Sony court ruled that the VCR
was capable of substantial noninfringing use, specifically time-shifting taping of
television programs, finding that even if unauthorized, the taping was a fair use.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 454-56.
144. Sony, 464 U.S. at 441.
.
145. Tickle, supra note 16, at 410.
146. Id. at 399-400. A contributory and vicarious copyright infringement action
was brought in a California district court in 1995 by copyright holders of texts of
the Church of Scientology against Netcom, an Internet access provider, for the infringing activities of a bulletin board subscriber. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 136l.
The case settled recently. See infra notes 171-234 and accompanying text. In 1993,
the Music Publisher's Association filed suit against CompuServe in a New York
district court for contributory copyright infringement of hundreds of songs uploaded
and downloaded by bulletin board subscribers. Frank Music Corp. v. CompuServe,
No. 93 Civ. 8153 (S.D.N.Y. med Nov. 19, 1993). That case settled on December 19,
1995. Raysman & Brown, supra note 62, at 3. This was the first legal action involving copyright infringement of music on the Internet. Pink, supra note 1, at
609.
147. Sega, 857 F. Supp. at 687-89.
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equipment necessary to copy the games. l48 Although the operator had not directly placed copies of Sega's game programs
onto the system, the court determined that its role in providing
facilities, direction, and encouragement materially contributed
to the infringing conduct of others. 149
3.

Vicarious infringement

To establish vicarious liability, the plaintiff must prove
that the defendant 1) had the right and ability to control the
direct infringer and 2) had a financial interest in the infringement. 150 Vicarious liability requires neither knowledge nor
participation. lSI Rather, a person may be liable for vicarious
infringement "when the right and ability to supervise coalesce
with an obvious and direct financial interest in the exploitation
of copyrighted materials .... "152 Thus, the focus is on the relationship between the defendant and the direct infringer. 153
Traditionally, precedent for vicarious copyright infringement liability has divided along the lines of two genres of relationships - landlord-tenant and dance hall operators. 1M Under the first genre, courts have held that a landlord who leases
her property at a fixed rental to a tenant who engages in copyright-infringing activity on the premises is not liable because
148. [d. at 683-85.
149. [d. at 686-87.
150. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375.
151. Goldberg, supra note 31, at 3.
152. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir.
1963).
153. Tickle, supra note 16, at 410.
154. Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 307. The theory of vicarious .liability stems from the
tort doctrine of respondeat superior. Segal, supra note 2, at 128. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer may be vicariously liable for copyright
infringement by an employee. Bradbury v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. 287
F.2d 478, 484-85 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 801 (1961) (holding theater
owner vicariously liable for copyright infringement by piano player employee even
though employer had no knowledge of infringement); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v.
Veltin, 47 F. Supp. 648, 649 (D.C. La. 1942) (holding dance hall operator vicariously liable for infringement by orchestra despite instructions not to play copyrighted materials). This relationship model, however, does not apply in the online
context because an employment relationship does not exist between the access provider or bulletin board operator and the computer user. Tickle, supra note 16 at
412. Even in the absence of an employer-employee relationship, the courts have
imposed liability in other business relationships. Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 307.
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she had no control over the leased premises. 155 In a seminal
case, Deutsch v. Arnold, the Second Circuit established that
something more than the mere relationship of landlord and
tenant must exist to give rise to vicarious liability.1s6 In that
case, the circuit court held that a landlord who leased outdoor
space to a tenant who sold infringing handwriting analysis
charts was not vicariously liable. 157 In its analysis, the court
found that the landlord leased the property at a fIxed rental
and received no fInancial benefIt from the acts of infringement. l58 In further support of its fInding that the landlord
was not liable under any theory of infringement, the court
found that the landlord had no knowledge of infringing activities at the time the lease was executed. 159
In the "dance hall" cases, however, the courts have held
dance hall operators liable for infringing performances by entertainers because they exercise control by leasing the premises or hiring the bands and receive profIts from patrons who
pay to attend performances. 1OO For example, in Dreamland
Ball Room v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 161 the Seventh Circuit
held the dance hall operator liable for the infringing perfo!mance of copyrighted songs played by the orchestra it hired
because the dance hall stood to make a profIt from the performance. 162 In its analysis, the Dreamland Ball Room court
found that hiring the orchestra to play music to increase its
audience created liability for the dance hall proprietor irrespec155. See Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686, 688 (2d Cir. 1938) (holding landlord
not liable for sales by tenant of infringing handwriting analysis charts due to lack
of knowledge and financial benefit); Fromont v. AEolian Co., 254 F. 592, 594
(D.C.N.Y. 1918) (holding landlord not liable for infringing performance of "Claire
De Lune" by pianist who leased concert hall at fixed rental due to lack of knowledge, control or financial benefit).
156. Deutsch, 98 F.2d at 688.
157. [d.
158. [d.
159. [d.
160. See, e.g., Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198-99 (1931)
(holding hotel proprietor liable for infringing performance of unlicensed musical
compositions on radio broadcasts aired on speakers in hotel); Famous Music Corp.
v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1213, 1215 (1st
Cir. 1977) (holding race track owner liable for infringing performance over public
address system of musical compositions supplied by independent contractor).
161. Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354, 355
(7th Cir. 1929).
162. [d.
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tive of whether the orchestra was an employee or independent
contractor or whether the dance hall operator selected the
music or knew that the music was copyrighted. 163
The leading case to synthesize the "dance-hall" model and
the landlord-tenant model, Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. B.L.
Green, articulated the two-prong test of control and financial
interest. l64 The infringing party in Shapiro had a concession
to operate a record store in defendant's department stores. l65
Under terms of their lease agreement, the store owner retained
the right to supervise the concessionaire's employees and received 10% of gross sales. l66 Determining that the relationship between the store owner and concessionaire was closer to
the dance-hall model than to the landlord-tenant model, the
Shapiro court held the store owner vicariously liable for the
sale of "bootleg" records. 167 In reaching its determination, the
court found that the lease gave the store owner power to exercise control over business activities on the premises as well as
employee conduct, and the right to a percentage of profits established a direct financial interest in the exploitation of the
copyrighted materials. 166
In the online context, the two-prong test of control and
financial interest means that a copyright holder must prove
that an access provider has the ability to monitor and control
thousands of postings by computer users and show a direct
financial interest in the infringing acts of subscribers. 169 To
determine vicarious liability, courts must decide if the relationship between an access provider and direct infringer is closer
on the spectrum to the dance-hall model or landlord-tenant
model. 170

163. Id.
164. Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 307.
165. Id. at 305.
166. Id. at 306.
167. Id. at 308.
168. Id. at 307-08.
169. See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text for articulation of test for
vicarious liability.
170. Tickle. supra note 16. at 405.
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C. AN ACCESS PROVIDER'S LIABILITY IN RELIGIOUS
TECHNOLOGY CENTER V. NETCOM ON-LINE COMMUNICATIONS
SERVICES
In the fIrst case to directly address the issue of an Internet
access provider's copyright infringement liability, Religious
Technology Center v. Netcom,171 a California federal district
court considered all three traditional theories: direct, contributory, and vicarious liability.172 In ruling on a pre-trial motion,
the court held that Netcom, one of the industry's largest access
providers,173 was not directly or vicariously liable for the infringing acts of a bulletin board subscriber. 174 The court, however, raised the possibility Netcom might be held contributorily
liable if the plaintiff proved knowledge. 175 Before the issue of
liability was resolved, the parties settled out-of-court. 176 Even
so, an examination of the court's analytic approach is useful in
revealing the approach future courts may take.
1.

Facts and procedural history

This copyright infringement action arose from unauthorized Internet postings by a bulletin board subscriber. 177 The
subscriber, a former Scientology minister who became a vocal
church critic, posted messages on a private bulletin board
service. 178 The Church of Scientology, through its Religious
Technology Center,179 alleged that the subscriber infringed its
copyrights when he posted confIdential lectures 1so by the 1ate
171. Religious Technology Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc.,
907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
172. Id. at 1367 n.9.
173. ISPs Double in Number Despite Industry Giants, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 24,
1996, at C4. Netcom has upwards of 500,000 subscribers. Id.
174. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1373-77.
175. Id. at·1373.
176. Benjamin Pimentel, Netcom Settles Scientology Copyright Suit, S.F. CHRON.,
Aug. 5, 1996, at A22.
177. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1365-66.
178. Id.
179. Plaintiffs Religious Technology Center and Bridge Publications, both nonprofit California corporations affiliated with the Church of Scientology, hold copyrights in the works of the Church's founder, L. Ron Hubbard. Id.
180. The Church claimed many of its literary works were copyrighted and also
trade secrets for a spiritual healing technology, referred to as the Advanced Technology works. Religious Technology Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Communication Servic-
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founder of Scientology, L. Ron Hubbard. 181 The subscriber addressed his message to a Usenet newsgroup182 organized exclusively to discuss and criticize the Scientology religion. 183
Although not directly linked to the Internet, the bulletin board
operator gained access by contracting with Netcom. l84 Once
the subscriber posted the message, Netcom's computers automatically copied and transmitted the message to other Usenet
sites via the computer network system of the Internet. 185
Shortly, the message was accessible to bulletin board subscribers throughout the world, available for downloading to their
own computers. 186
The Church notified Netcom and the bulletin board service
operator about the alleged infringement, but both refused to do
anything about it.187 In February, 1995, the Church sued the
es, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1239 (1995). The Ninth Circuit described the Church's
teachings as a belief that a person's behavior and well-being are improved by removing "engrams" from the unconscious mind. Religious Technology Ctr. v.
Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1077 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1103
(1987). Engrams are impressions recorded in the unconscious mind in times of
trauma which return in moments of stress. Removing engrams from one's unconscious permits the person's mind to function unhindered. Engrams are purged
through "auditing," which uses the "advanced technology" of the Church. The
Church asserted that the unsupervised, premature exposure to the Advanced Technology course materials would have a spiritually harmful effect. [d. During his
years with the Church, from approximately 1968 until 1982, the defendant former
minister received training to provide counseling services, known as "auditing." Religious Technology Center, 923 F. Supp. at 1238-39.
181. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1365-66.
182. The Usenet has been described as a worldwide network of electronic bulletin boards. [d. at 1365 n.4. It is one of the most popular methods of communication on the Internet. American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824,
833-34 (E.D. Pa. 1996). Messages are divided into topical "newsgroups." Netcom,
907 F. Supp. at 1365 n.4. The Usenet system functions as a public discussion forum or "chat room" on the Internet, a way for people around the world to exchange information and debate topics which interest them. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at
834-35. The former minister posted his message to "alt.religion.scientology," the
Usenet newsgroup organized solely to discuss and criticize Scientology. Netcom,
907 F. Supp. at 1365-66. Using many computer network systems, including the
Internet, each Usenet server automatically distributes its users' postings to other
Usenet sites that subscribe to the newsgroup for review by individual users.
ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 835-36. Similarly, responses to messages are automatically
distributed to all other host computers for that newsgroup. Periodically, messages
are automatically purged from each system to make room for new messages. [d.
183. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1365-66.
184. [d.
185. [d. at 1367-68.
186. [d.

187. [d. at 1368. Netcom contended that it would be impossible to prescreen the
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subscriber, the bulletin board operator, and Netcom for copyright infringement, seeking damages and injunctive relief. 188

2.

Court's analysis and conclusion

In November, 1995, the federal district court held that the
access provider was not directly or vicariously liable. 189 However, the court concluded that the existence of a genuine issue
of fact as to Netcom's knowledge of the infringement precluded
granting Netcom's motion for summary judgment on the issue
of contributory infringement. 190 The court indicated that
Netcom may have been contributorily liable by failing to remove the infringing documents if plaintiff could prove Netcom
had knowledge of the infringement. 191

a. Direct infringement
Although acknowledging that Netcom was not itself the
source of the infringing materials, the Church alleged that
Netcom was liable either directly, contributorily, or vicariously.192 Regarding direct liability, the Church pointed out that
Netcom's computers made copies of the infringing materials
and stored them in its memory system for a short period of
time. 193 Netcom argued that copying was a necessary fwiction

subscriber's postings. [d. at 1366. To remove the subscriber from the Internet,
Netcom argued, would entail closing off Internet access to all of the other bulletin
board subscribers. [d.
188. Religious Technology Center, 923 F. Supp. at 1240. The suit also claimed
misappropriation of trade secrets by the subscriber. [d. In February, 1995, the district court granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the subscriber from further
copying of the protected religious works. [d. at 1258. The court also authorized a
writ of seizure directing authorities to raid the subscriber's home to seize copyrighted documents. [d. at 1240. The writ was later vacated for defects. [d. at
1265. In September, 1995, the court granted a preliminary injunction against the
subscriber to enjoin further posting of Scientology materials on the Internet. [d.
189. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1373-77. The analysis in this Comment focuses on
the liability of the access provider defendant only. See infra notes 171-234 and accompanying text.
190. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1381.
191. Id. at 1374.
192. [d. at 1367.
193. [d. at 1370.
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of the computer network system, that it did not take any affirmative action other than implementing a software system that
automatically made· copies of messages to retransmit onto the
Usenet network. l94 Netcom compared itself to a common carrier that merely acts as a passive conduit for information. 195
To establish a claim of direct copyright infringement, a
plaintiff must show ownership of a valid copyright and "copyiIig" of a protectable expression by the defendant. l96 Although
the Netcom court agreed that copying occurred,197 pointing to
the Ninth Circuit's decision in MAl v. Peak Computer/9S the
court refused to hold the access provider directly liable. l99 In
its analysis, the court distinguished the factual setting in
MAl.2oo In MAl, a computer service technician booted up a
computer to check its error log to diagnose a problem. 201 In so
doing, the copyrighted operating system software was loaded
into the computer's random access memory, thus creating a
copy.202 Unlike the defendant in MAl, Netcom did not initiate
the copying. 203 Rather, the court found that Netcom's computer system automatically made a temporary copy of all data
sent through it as a necessary function to forward messages
onto the Usenet system and that the copying involved no human intervention. 204 The court reasoned that some element of
volition must exist for direct liability.205 The Netcom court expressed concern that, carried to its natural extreme, plaintift's
theory would result in unreasonable liability, implicating every

194. [d. at 1368. Netcom also argued, alternatively, it had a fair use privilege.
[d. at 1378.
195. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1369 n.12. The court disagreed with the analogy,
noting that Internet access providers are not natural monopolies that are bound to
carry all traffic without any control over who or what was on its system. [d.
196. [d. at 1366-67.
197. [d. at 1368.
198. MAl Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding repair person made copy of system software in computer's random access
memory when he booted up computer).
199. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1372-73.
200. [d. at 1368.
201. MAl, 991 F.2d at 518.
202. [d. at 518.
203. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1368.
204. [d. at 1368-70.
205. [d.
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single Usenet server in the worldwide link.206 Accordingly,
the court concluded that Netcom was not directly liable for the
incidental copying of the subscriber's infringing materials in its
computer storage system and retransmission to other host
computers. 207

b. Contributory infringement
The Church asserted that Netcom had knowledge of the
infringing postings, at least after plaintiffs notified them by
letter.206 Despite such knowledge, Netcom failed to remove
the· infringing materials or bar the bulletin board subscriber
from further access to the Scientology newsgroup.209 Netcom
made several arguments in its defense. 21o First, Netcom argued that it did not know of the subscriber's intention to infringe when it contracted with the bulletin board operator to
provide access to the Internet. 211 The access provider cited
cases holding that a landlord is not contributorily liable for
infringing activities of its tenants on its premises unless the
landlord had knowledge of the ·intended infringing use at the
time the lease was signed. 212 In addition, Netcom argued that
it did not know that the subscriber would infringe prior to the
postings. 213 Next, Netcom contended that it did not have the

206. Id.
207. Id. at 1372-73. In its analysis, the court also distinguished Playboy v.
Frena. Id. at 1370. In Playboy, the court held the bulletin board operator directly
liable for infringing the rights to publicly distribute and display works. Playboy
Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1993). Since the Church
did not allege infringement of the right to display, the Netcom court concluded the
Playboy decision had no bearing on the issue of direct liability for unauthorized
reproduction, thus finding the case inapplicable. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1370.
The Netcom court also distinguished Sega v. MAPHIA, noting the court mixed elements of contributory infringement in its discussion of direct infringement. Id. at
1371. Notwithstanding the Sega court's holding of direct liability, the Netcom court
disagreed, based on its opinion that the theory of holding the Internet system liable is unworkable because it is practically impossible to screen out infringing from
noninfringing content. Id. at 1372-73.
208. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1373.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1373.
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ability to screen out infringing messages before they were
posted. 214 Further, Netcom argued that its knowledge was too
equivocal in light of the difficulty of assessing valid copyright
registration and any fair use defense. 215
To establish liability as a contributory infringer; plaintiff
must prove the defendant had knowledge of the infringement
and participated by "inducing, causing or materially contributing to the infringing conduct of another.,,216 In its analysis of
the knowledge component of the test, the Netcom court rejected
Netcom's argument that proof of valid copyright was too difficult to verify, given that the works contained copyright notices.217 However, the court was persuaded that Netcom might
be able to show that its lack of knowledge was reasonable. 218
The court reasoned that an access provider might not be able
to quickly determine if a work infringes when a colorable defense of fair use exists. 219 Thus, a genuine issue of fact relating to the theory of contributory infringement precluded the
court from granting Netcom's motion for summary judgment. 220
In its analysis of the participation component of the test,
the Netcom court concluded that Netcom's failure to cancel the
subscriber's message constituted substantial participation. 221
To illustrate, the court compared the access provider to radio
stations that were found liable for rebroadcasting infringing
broadcasts rather than to a swap meet operator who rents
space to an infringer and is not liable. 222 The court reasoned

214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).·
217. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1374.
218. Id. at 1374.
219. [d. at 1374-75. In analyzing the fair use defense, the court stressed that
the proper focus was whether Netcom's actions qualified as fair use, not whether
the subscriber engaged in fair use. Id. at 1378. The court did not fmd that
Netcom's use was fair, noting a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether the
postings could harm the market for the religious works. Id. at 1380-81.
220. Id. at 1374-75.
221. Id.
222. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375. The Netcom court cited Select Theatres
Corp. v. Ronzoni Macaroni Corp., 59 U.S.P.Q. 288, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (holding radio station liable for infringing rebroadcasts) and Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction,
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that providing a service for automatic distribution of U senet
postings, infringing and noninfringing, went well beyond simply renting space to an infringer. 223 Further, the court reasoned, Netcom's failure to remove the message substantially
aided in the accomplishment of the infringement. 224 Thus, the
court concluded that if plaintiffs proved knowledge, the access
provider may be contributorily liable. 225
c. Vicarious infringement

The Church alleged that Netcom had the right and ability
to control the use of its system, pointing to contract terms with
Netcom subscribers that reserved the right to take remedial
action, prohibited copyright infringement, and indemnified it
for any damage to third parties. 226 Further, the Church alleged that Netcom had policed the conduct of users in the past,
pointing to evidence of suspensions of Netcom subscribers for
commercial advertising, off-topic postings, and posting obscene
materials. 227 The Church also asserted that N etcom somehow
derived a financial benefit from its failure to enforce violations
of copyright law. 228 Netcom contended it was unable to screen
messages before they were posted given the speed and volume
of the data that goes through its system. 229
To prove vicarious liability, a plaintiff must show that the
defendant has the right and ability to control the infringer's
acts and receives a direct financial benefit from the infringement. 230 In its analysis of the right and ability to control, the
court found plaintiffs raised a genuine issue of fact as to
Inc., 847 F. Supp. 1492, 1496 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (holding swap meet operator not liable for infringing sales of bootleg records by vendors). [d. The Netcom court did
not have the benefit of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Fonovisa reversing the lower court. See infra notes 240-83.
223. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375.
224. [d.
225. [d. at 1374.
226. [d. at 1375-76.
227. [d. at 1376.
228. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1376.
229. [d.
230. [d.; see Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 306 (2d
Cir. 1963) (articulating vicarious liability test of control and financial interest).
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Netcom's right and ability to exercise control over its subscribers.231 In its analysis of direct financial benefit, the Netcom
court concluded plaintiffs failed to provide any evidence to
support its assertions. 232 The court reasoned that unlike the
percentage of gross sales in Shapiro, Netcom received a fixed
fee. 233 For these reasons, the court held Netcom not vicariously liable. 234
III. DISCUSSION
Although the environment of a swap meet is a strange
context for a legal discussion concerning leading edge technology, the recent decision in Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction235 may
have a significant impact on liability issues for the digital
environment of Internet access providers. 236 The case is significant because the copyright infringement dispute discussed
in the case concerns contributory and vicarious liability, the
case is recent,237 it is an appellate level decision in the Ninth
Circuit, and it reversed a lower court dismissal that was cited
prominently in the Netcom case. 23S By applying the legal
principles in Fonovisa to the facts in Netcom, this Comment
theorizes that future courts may hold an online access provider
both contributorily liable and vicariously liable for the infringing conduct of subscribers. 239
A. A SWAP MEET OPERATOR'S THIRD PARTY LIABILITY IN
FONOVISA V. CHERRY AUCTION

In holding that the plaintiff established a claim against
the swap meet operator for vicarious and contributory infringement for the sale of bootleg records by vendors, the Ninth
Circuit court identified circumstances to impose third party
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238 ..
907 F.
239.

Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1376.
[d. at 1377.
[d.
[d.
Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
Goldberg, supra note 31, at 3.
Fonovisa was. decided January 25, 1996. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 259.
Religious Technology Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Communication Servs., Inc.,
Supp. 1361, 1375-77 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
See infra notes 287-353 and accompanying text.
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liability that may subject an online access provider to more
rigorous scrutiny.240 The Fonovisa court expanded the ways
to show direct financial benefit and characterized the provision
of a site and support services as materially contributing to infringing activities of another.241
1.

Facts and procedural history

Cherry Auction operated a swap meet in Fresno, California, similar to hundreds of other "flea markets" across the
country where customers come to buy various merchandise
from individual vendors.242 Cherry Auction collected a daily
rental fee from independent vendors in exchange for booth
space, as well as entrance fees from each customer who attended the swap meet. 243 Cherry Auction also supplied parking,
promoted the meet in advertisements, and retained the right to
exclude any vendor for any reason at any time.244
At its swap meet in Fresno, independent vendors repeatedly sold counterfeit recordings in violation of copyright and
trademark rules.245 The Cherry Auction operators were
undisputedly aware of these sales. 246 In prior years, the
Sheriffs Department had raided the swap meet and seized
more than 38,000 counterfeit recordings. 247 When sales of
counterfeit recordings did not abate, the Sheriff's Department
sent a warning letter to Cherry Auction to stop the infringing
activities.246
In February, 1993, Fonovisa, Inc. (hereinafter "Fonovisa"),
a California corporation that owned copyrights and trademarks
to Latin and Hispanic music recordings, brought an action
against Cherry Auction for direct, contributory and vicarious

Fonovisa. 76 F.3d at 262-64.
Id.
Id. at 261.
Id.
Id.
Fonovisa. 76 F.3d at 260-61.
Id.
Id.
248. Id.

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
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copyright infringement. 249 The district court granted
defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).250 The district court held that Fonovisa did not meet either the control or
the financial benefit prong of the vicarious liability test. 251
The court reasoned that the collection of a flat fee for booth
rentals did not constitute a direct financial interest. 252 In its
view, Cherry Auction was in the same position as an absentee
landlord who has surrendered its right of occupancy to its tenants.253 The district court concluded that Cherry Auction neither supervised nor profited from vendors' sales. 254 In dismissing the claim of contributory infringement, the district
court concluded that merely renting booth space to vendors did
not constitute substantial participation. 255
The Ninth Circuit strongly disagreed. 256 On appeal, the
circuit court reversed the district court's dismissal, remanding
the case to the trial COurt. 257 The appellate court held that
the complaint stated a cause of action for both· contributory
and vicarious copyright infringement.258
2.

Court's analysis

On appeal, Fonovisa did not challenge the district court's
dismissal of its claim for direct infringement, but did appeal
the dismissal of its claims for contributory and vicarious infringement. 259 The court analyzed Fonovisa under each of the
two theories of liability. 260

249. [d.
250. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 26l.
251. [d. at 262.
252. [d.
253. [d.
254. [d.
255. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264.
256. [d. at 262-64.
257. [d. at 265.
258. [d. at 264. The Ninth Circuit also held that the complaint stated a cause
of action for contributory trademark iDfringement. [d. at 265. However, trademark
issues are beyond the focus of this Comment.
259. [d. at 26l.
260. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 261-64.
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Contributory infringement

Liability for contributory infringement requires knowledge
and participation in the infringing conduct of another.261 In
its analysis, the Ninth Circuit court stated that Cherry Auction
knew that vendors repeatedly sold counterfeit records at its
swap meet, based on evidence of a raid by the Sheriffs Department and a warning letter sent by the Sheriff. 262 The dispute
focused on whether Cherry Auction participated in the infringing acts. 263 Cherry Auction contended it was a passive participant, providing only rental space. 2M Contrary to Cherry
Auction's characterization and the district court's view that
participation means expressly promoting or encouraging the
sale of counterfeit products,265 the Fonovisa court embraced
the Third Circuit's view that simply providing the site and
facilities for infnnging activities was sufficient to establish
contributory liability.266 The Fonovisa court reasoned that in
providing a site, plumbing, utilities, parking, advertising, and
customers for the illicit sales, Cherry Auction materially contributed to the infringing activities. 267 Indeed, the court stated, it would be difficult for the infringing activity to take place
in the massive quantities alleged without such support services
from the swap meet. 268 Thus, the court held that Fonovisa
established a claim against Cherry Auction for contributory
infringement. 269

261. Id. at 264.
262. Id. at 261.
263. Id. at 264.
264. Id.
265. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 1492, 1496 (E.D. Cal.
1994) (hereinafter "Fonovisa I")
266. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264 (citing Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco,
Inc., 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986».
267. [d.
268. [d.
269. [d.
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Vicarious infringement

Vicarious liability requires the right and ability to control
the infringer and also a direct financial interest in the infringement. 270 Regarding the element of control, Fonovisa alleged that Cherry Auction had the contractual right to terminate vendors for any reason, arguing that through that right it
had the ability to control and police the activities of vendors on
the premises. 271 In addition, Fonovisa alleged that. Cherry
Auction promoted the swap meet and controlled access to the
swap meet area. 272 Cherry Auction contended that it neither
supervised nor profited from vendor sales. 273
In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit found that Cherry Auction wielded broad control over the direct iruringers under its
contract rights to police the vendors. 274 The court reasoned
that the ability to police, whether exerted or not, is sufficient
control to satisfy the control element of vicarious liability.275
In reaching its determination, the court found that Cherry
Auction's participation as a promoter and organizer enabled it
to wield control over the infringing vendors. 276
As to the fmancial benefit analysis, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that Cherry Auction derived a financial benefit from
the illegal vendor sales. 277 Cherry Auction contended that it
received merely a fixed rental fee rather than a commission on

270. [d. at 262.
271. FOTU)visa, 76 F.3d at 262.
272. [d.
273. [d.
274. Id. at 262-63. The court noted striking fact similarities with Shapiro v.
Green in which a contract with the concessionaire vested broad control in the store
owner over employee conduct and activities on the premises, sufficient to establish
vicarious liability. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 263.
275. Id. The Ninth Circuit appeared to embrace the reasoning of the court in
Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1163 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding concert promoter vicariously liable for infringing activities of concert artists) by reference. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 263; see also Polygram
Intern. Pub., Inc. v. NevadaJTIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1328-29 (D. Mass. 1984)
(finding computer trade show organizer wielded control over exhibitors through
contract rules).
276. FOTU)visa, 76 F.3d at 263. In its analysis, the court compared Cherry Auction to the concert promoter in Gershwin. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262-63.
277. Id. at 263.
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vendors' gross receipts as in the Shapiro 27S fact setting.279
Nonetheless, the Fonovisa court saw similarities to the dance
hall cases in which the dance hall operators benefited by the
number of patrons drawn to performances of infringing music. 28O The court reasoned that the sale of pirated recordings
at the swap meet acted as a draw for customers. 2S1 Besides
the flat fee Cherry Auction collected for booth rental, the court
found that the swap meet operator collected admission fees,
parking fees and concession sales, flowing directly from customers who came to buy the counterfeit recordings at bargain
basement prices. 2S2 Thus, the Ninth Circuit also found that
Fonovisa stated a claim for vicarious copyright infringement.283
B. APPLYING PRINCIPLES OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
LIABILITY IN FONOVISA TO NETCOM

Whether the Netcom court would have analyzed the liability of the access provider differently if it had the benefit of the
Ninth Circuit's Fonovisa opinion is an open question. 284 The
Netcom decision fell in time between the district court's opinion
in Fonovisa and the Ninth Circuit's reversal of that opinion. 285 Nevertheless, a post-settlement review of Netcom that
extrapolates the Fonovisa court's analytic approach may reveal
the circumstances in which future courts may hold an online

278. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir.
1963).
279. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 263.
280. [d. at 263-64.
281. [d.
282. [d.
283. [d. at 264.
284. Goldberg, supra note 31, at 33.
285. [d. Netcom was decided November 21, 1995. Religious Technology Ctr. v.
Netcom On-line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
Fonovisa was decided January 25, 1996. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76
F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996). On February 16, 1996, copyright holders in Netcom filed
a motion to reconsider based on the theory of a change in controlling law on vicarious liability as a result of the appellate court's decision in Fonovisa. Plaintiffs
Motion to Reconsider at 1:20-25, Religious Technology Ctr. v. Netcom, 907 F.
Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (No. 95-20091). On March 4, 1996, the court denied
the motion to reconsider, finding no inconsistency between the district court's holding and the appellate court decision in Fonovisa. Order Den. Leave to File Mot.
for Recons. at 1-2, Netcom (No. 95-20091).
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access provider liable for the infringing activities of subscribers. This Comment applies the legal principles of vicarious and
contributory copyright infringement liability in Fonovisa to the
factual setting in Netcom. 286
1. Vicarious copyright infringement of an online access provider
To prove vicarious liability, a plaintiff must show that an
access provider 1) has the right and ability to control the direct
infringer's acts and 2) receives a direct financial benefit from
the infringement. 287 In Fonovisa, the Ninth Circuit held that
the plaintiff stated a claim for vicarious liability because the
swap meet operator not only controlled the activities of vendors, but also profited from the sales of counterfeit records by
attracting more bargain hunters, thus resulting in more collateral fees to the swap meet operator. 288 The Fonovisa court's
holding raises the possibility that an access provider may be
vicariously liable for the infringing activities of its subs cribers.289

a. Right and ability to control the direct infringer's conduct
The Fonovisa court concluded that the swap meet operator
had the right and ability to control the direct infringers. 29o
Based on explicit contract rights to terminate vendors for any
reason, the court found that the swap meet operator was in a
position to police the vendors and their activities. 291 In addition, the court found that the swap meet operator wielded
control over vendors and customers by virtue of its role in
promoting and organizing the swap meet, irrespective of contractual control. 292

286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

See infra notes 287-354 and accompanying text.
Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375.
Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 263-64.
Goldberg, supra note 31, at 33.
Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262-63.
[d.
Id.
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In applying the control prong of the Fonovisa court's analysis of vicarious liability to Netcom, a court would find that the
access provider had the right to supervise and control the conduct of its subscribers because of its contractual rights. 293
Similar to contract terms between the swap meet operator and
vendors, the court would point to terms in Netcom's contract
reserving the right to suspend a subscriber's account. 294 As.
evidence that Netcom exercised its control over user's activities, the court would also point to evidence in the record citing
over one thousand instances of suspensions of subscribers'
accounts. 295 In addition, a court would point to other contract
terms prohibiting copyright infringement and requiring indemnification as further evidence of Netcom's right to control subscriber conduct. 296 Based on such rights, the court would conclude that the access provider was in a position to police subscribers and their posting activities on the Internet.
Although the Fonovisa court described an alternative
method of wielding control by promoting and organizing the
entertainment venue, the court would not find that Netcom
resembled the swap meet operator in that respect. 297 No evidence indicated that the access provider exercised control of
subscribers by promoting or organizing the Scientology
newsgroup or any other use of its system. 298 Thus, the court
would rely on contract rights to support its conclusion that the
access provider in Netcom had the right and ability to control
the conduct of its subscribers. 299
The Fonovisa analysis, however, is inapplicable to Netcom
293. See supra notes 270-76 and accompanying text for discussion of the control
element of vicarious liability by the Fonovisa court.
294. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375. The court noted that even though Netcom
had no contractual relationship with the direct infringer, it had the right and ability to control the use of its system through its contractual relationship with the
bulletin board operator. [d. at 1376 n.22.
295. [d. at 1376. These suspensions were for reasons other than copyright infringement, such as posting off-topic messages, commercial advertising, and posting
obscene materials. [d.
296. [d.
297. See Gershwin , 443 F.2d at 1163 (finding concert promoter in position to
control direct infringer).
298. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375-76.
299. See supra notes 274-76 and accompanying text for Fonovisa court's discussion of Cherry Auction's control through contractual rights.
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because of the special context of its digital environment. 30o In.
the framework of a swap meet, the Fonovisa court focused
strictly on the aspect of the "right" to control the direct
infringer's conduct, and collapsed that concept into the "ability"
aspect of the control test.301 The setting in Fonovisa, however,
is distinguishable from the digital environment in Netcom. 302
Unlike the contained geographical space of a swap meet, the
electronic space of the Internet has no physical boundaries. 303
Moreover, an access provider's technical capability to patrol
the Internet is a contentious issue. 304 The volume of messages and speed of transmission pose formidable technical
challenges to an access provider to screen messages before its
host computer transmits bulletin board messages via the
Internet. 305 Netcom stated it did not have software capability
to screen messages before they travel the Internet nor the
ability to determine whether a message is an infringing
one. 306 Since the Fonovisa court did not address the aspect of
"ability" specifically, it is uncertain whether an access provider
has the "right and ability to control" subscriber's conduct.

b.

Direct financial benefit

In considering the second element of direct financial benefit, the Fonovisa court looked beyond the fixed rental fee the
swap meet operator received from vendors and concluded that
the operator derived substantial financial benefits from the

300. See infra notes 301-07 and accompanying text.
301. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262-63.
302. See supra notes 242-48 and accompanying text for factual setting in
Fonovisa.
303. American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Pa.
1996).
304. See supra notes 208-09, 214, 221-29 and accompanying text.
305. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1376. Netcom estimated that 150 million key
strokes of information passed over its transmission lines per day. Netcom's Mem.
of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, n. 16, Religious Technology Ctr. v.
Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (No. 95-20091).
306. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1376. The court noted the lack of evidence to indicate that Netcom or anyone could design software that could determine whether
a posting is infringing. [d. at 1376 n.23.
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infringing sales. 307 In reaching its determination, the court
reflected that the swap meet operator's revenues increased in
direct proportion to the number of customers attracted by the
sale of counterfeit records at bargain basement prices.30S The
court pointed out that in addition to a fIxed daily rental fee
from vendors for booth space, the operator collected admission
fees, parking fees, and food concession sales from customers. 309
In applying the Fonovisa court's analysis, the court would
fInd that Netcom derived a direct fInancial benefIt because of
incremental increases in the number of subscribers drawn to
its service to exploit the presence of copyrighted materials. 310
The court would point out that although Netcom only collected
a flat rate irrespective of usage by subscribers, the access provider collected "extra" fees from more subscribers attracted to
the Internet.3l1 Thus, in expanding the ways to show fInancial benefIt, the court would fInd that Netcom derived direct
fInancial benefIt from more subscribers because of the infringing activities. 312
Here too, the Fonovisa court's analysis is incomplete because of the complexity of the role of ~ Internet access provider.313 Unlike the additional sources of revenue flowing directly from customers attracted to the swap meet, the access provider does not reap any extra fees from subscribers who might
download infringing material. 314 Netcom's service has no
counterpart to parking fees or profIts from concession
sales. 315 An access provider, dissimilar from a content provider, has no proprietary interest in the information available on
its system. 316

307. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 263.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 263 (discussing element of financial benefit under
theory of vicarious liabilty).
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
314. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1376-77.
315. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 263.
316. See supra note 26 and accompanying text on distinction between access
provider and content provider.
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Even if the presence of infringing works made the Internet
more attractive, an increase in subscribers to the Internet
would not necessarily benefit Netcom. 317 Postings of the
Church's religious works were equally accessible from any of
the tens of thousands of Usenet sites that hosted the
Scientology newsgroup.318 Thus, a new subscriber could sign
up with any access provider, not necessarily Netcom, to access
the religious works. 319 The copyright holders in Netcom introduced no evidence to show that. the infringing po stings attracted new subscribers or otherwise contributed directly to the
access provider's financial success. 320
In applying the Fonovisa court's vicarious copyright infringement analysis to Netcom, however, the court would likely
find that plaintiffs proved both the elements of control and
financial benefit.321 Thus, the court would hold Netcom vicariously liable. 322
2. Contributory copyright infringement of an online access
provider
The different contexts of a swap meet and the digitized
environment of the Internet complicate the analysis. of the
theory of contributory copyright infringement as well. 323 To
establish liability as a contributory infringer, the plaintiff must
prove that the defendant 1) knew or should have known of the
infringing activity and 2) participated by inducing, causing or
materially contributing to the infringing conduct of another. 324 In Fonovisa, the court held the swap meet operator liable as a contributory infringer because the swap meet operator
was both aware of the sales of bootleg records by vendors, and

317. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
318. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 834.
319. [d.
320. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1377.
321. See supra notes 270-83 and accompanying text for Fonovisa court's analysis
of vicarious liability.
322. See supra notes 270-83 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 113-49 and accompanying text for discussion of contributory liability.
324. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 437-38
n.18 (1984).
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materially contributed to the illicit sales by providing the venue and advertising support to attract customers.325

a.

Knowledge

The Fonovisa court concluded that, based on the pleadings,
the swap meet operator had unequivocal knowledge of the
infringing sales. 326 Based on a raid by the Sheriff's Department, confiscation of thousands of counterfeit tape recordings
at the swap meet, and written notification by the Sheriff of
continuing counterfeit sales by vendors, the court held that the
swap meet operators were clearly on notice of the infringing
activities. 327 A court applying the Fonovisa analysis would
likely find that the access provider in Netcom had knowledge of
the subscriber's infringing posting because of the letter from
the copyright holders. 328 Based on such notification, that
court would conclude that the access provider knew of the
infringing activities yet continued to provide the subscriber
access to the Internet via the bulletin board. 329
Because of factual differences in the cases, however, the
Fonovisa analysis may not be dispositive. In Fonovisa, the
swap meet operator received notification of the infringing sales
from a law enforcement authority.33o The raid and seizure of
counterfeit records were conducted under court orders. 33l
Moreover, the vendors did not raise a fair use defense. 332 Given those circumstances, the court regarded the element of
knowledge adequately alleged. 333 In contrast, Netcom's
knowledge that the posted material infringed the Church's
copyright was based solely on the plaintiff's letter to

325. Fonovisa. 76 F.3d at 264.
326. Id. at 261.
327. Id.
328. Netcom. 907 F. Supp. at 1366.
329. See supra notes 113-38 and accompanying
knowledgeelement of contributory infringement.
330. Fonovisa. 76 F.3d at 261.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 264.
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Netcom. 3M The plaintiff's request to remove the posting was
not backed by a court order.335 Although the religious materials displayed a copyright notice,336 a determination that the
former minister fairly used the materials to illustrate his criticism of the religion would excuse any infringing conduct. 337
Thus, without a judicial assessment of fair use, it is not clear
that the access provider had adequate knowledge of the infringement. 33S

b.

Substantial participation

Even with certain knowledge, a plaintiff must also show a
third party's substantial participation in the infringing activity.339 The Fonovisa court held that the swap meet operator
materially contributed to the infringing conduct by providing
the vendors space, utilities, parking, advertising, and customers.340 Indeed, the court held that the sale of infringing recordings could not have taken place in such massive quantities
without the venue and support services provided by the swap
meet operator. 341
Similarly, by applying the Fonovisa court's analysis to
Netcom, a court would find that the access provider substantially contributed to the infringing conduct of the subscriber.M2 Under that analysis, merely providing the site and facilities for known infringing activity may establish contributory
liability.343 To buttress its view, a court would point out that
posting and downloading the copyrighted works across the
computer network system could not take place without access

334. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1374.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text for discussion of fair use defense.
338. See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
339. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375.
340. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264.
341. Id.
342. See supra notes 115-49 and accompanying text for discussion of substantial
participation in contributory infringement.
343. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264.
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to the Internet and its software support system. 344 Thus, a
court applying such analysis would hold that infringement of
the Church's copyrighted works could not have taken place by
such a large number of subscribers without access to the digital environment of the Internet and computer support services
provided by Netcom.
Yet, the context is distinguishable. 345 In comparable
terms to the swap meet, the Internet network is the site where
transactions take place, and the access to the Internet is the
road or gateway to that site. 346 Therefore, Netcom did not
provide the site for the infringing activity. Rather, Netcom
provided one of the many access routes to the Internet. 347
Since the Fonovisa court did not contemplate the technology
roles of players on the Internet, the· potential liability of an
online access provider regarding the element of substantial
participation remains uncertain. 346
c.

Substantial noninfringing use

Even if an access provider were deemed to materially
contribute to infringing activity of others, the doctrine of "substantial noninfringing uses" articulated by the Supreme Court
in Sony, may exempt an access provider from contributory
liability.349 Applying this doctrine to an access provider, a
court would not find liability if the access provider could show
that its product was widely used for legitimate unobjectionable
purposes. 350 Thus, assuming that an access provider could
show such noninfringing use, the access provider would not be
held liable. 351 Since the Fonovisa court did not explore this

344. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 831-32 (describing the nature of the Internet).
345. See supra notes 177-86, 242-48 and accompanying text for comparison of
factual settings in Netcom and Fonovisa.
346. See supra note 5 and accompanying text for description of the Internet.
347. See supra note 26 and accompanying text for description of the role of an
access provider.
348. Elkin-Koren, supra note 16, at 372-73.
349. Taitz, supra note 46, at 136; see supra notes 113-49 and accompanying
text on contributory infringement liability.
350. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
351. [d.
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issue, and no other court has applied the doctrine to an online
service provider, the contributory liability of an access provider
remains unclear. 352
In applying the Fonovisa court's analysis of contributory
copyright infringement to Netcom, a court would likely find
that plaintiffs proved both the elements of knowledge and
substantial participation. 353 Under such an analysis, the access provider would be contributorily liable for the infringing
conduct of a subscriber.
IV. CONCLUSION
Copyright owners and Internet access providers view the
problem of copyright infringement liability from diametric
positions. 3M Copyright owners urge greater liability through
the traditional copyright principles of contributory and vicarious infringement. 355 Online access providers urge that liability should attach only when or if the access provider has actual
knowledge of the infringement, and has the capability of removing the infringement, but fails to do so within a reasonable
amount of time. 356 Thus, the proposal combines the knowledge standard of contributory liability and the control aspect of
vicarious liability.357
Legislation has not addressed the issue of a standard for
access provider liability.358 The final report of the Clinton
Administration's Working Group on Intellectual Property
Rights, known as the White Paper, simply concluded that because the access providers are in a better position to police
infringing users than the copyright owners, the best policy
would be to hold the access provider liable. 359 The White Paper states that the threat of liability will motivate the access

352. Id.
353. See supra notes 261-69 and accompanying text for Fonovisa court's analysis
of contributory infringement.
354. Goldberg, supra note 31, at 3.
355. Id.
356. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 74.
357. Id..
358. Raysman & Brown, supra note 62, at 3.
359. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 76.
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provider to seek indemnification and licensing agreements, and
spread the risk of liability through increased prices and insurance. 360 Perhaps SO.361
Spreading the costs of copyright infringement, however,
does not replace the need for unambiguous liability standards
governing intellectual property rights on the Internet. 362 Legal standards of liability for copyright infringement lag behind
advances in digital technology and growth of the Internet. 363
It is time once more for Congress to respond to technology
changes. 3M
Mary Ann Shulman·

360. Id.
361. Taitz, supra note 46, at 160-61.
362. Segal, supra note 2, at 138.
363. Tickle, supra note 16; at 392 n.5. For example, strict liability under the
Copyright Act for copying messages to transmit them to other host computers is
not a workable theory. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1372-73 (finding strict liability
unreasonable for automatic copying of messages by access provider's computers).
364. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 10. Thomas Jefferson stated: "I am not
an advocate for frequent changes in laws and constitutions. But laws and institutions must go hand and hand with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths
discovered and manners and opinions change, with the change of circumstances,
institutions must advance also to keep pace with the times. We might as well require a man to wear still the .coat which fitted him when a boy . . . ." Id. at 7-8
(quoting inscription at the Jefferson Memorial, Washington, D.C.).
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